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Abstract 
We use a net present value framework to examine the impact of non-permanence on 
the economics of land-based biological carbon sequestration. Contingent on assumptions 
about discount rates, management, and carbon prices trajectories, and payment contract 
design, we find the adjusted value of carbon sequestration relative to permanently 
available emission offsets to be between 38 and 55 percent for agricultural soil offsets 
and between 51 and 99 percent for afforestation offsets. Simulations with an Agricultural 
Sector Model show the empirical effect of sequestration value discounts on the total 
potential of U.S. agricultural sinks to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions within a multi-
strategy setting. 
 
 
 
Key words: Agricultural Sector Model, carbon price trajectory, carbon sequestration 
dynamics, economics of greenhouse gas emission mitigation, forest sink discounting, 
mathematical programming, net present value, saturation, volatility.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
INFLUENCES OF PERMANENCE ON THE COMPARATIVE VALUE  
OF BIOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION VERSUS EMISSIONS OFFSETS 
Introduction 
Emerging policies directed toward greenhouse gas emission (GHGE) reductions are 
causing governments and industries to consider the merits of GHGE mitigation 
possibilities. Land-based biological sequestration (LBS) is being evaluated as one 
potential way to achieve net GHGE reductions. Some have argued that LBS strategies are 
relatively inexpensive ways of lessening GHGE mitigation costs as well as increasing 
economic opportunities for farmers and foresters (Dixon et al.; Sampson and Sedjo; 
Marland and Schlamadinger). However, there seem to be doubts in the international 
community regarding issues of permanence, leakage, monitoring, measurement, and 
transaction costs. Here, we investigate the effects of permanence, examining the 
influence of permanence on the relative value of an LBS offset versus a direct emission 
offset. Specifically, we estimate the relative value to a carbon purchaser of LBS and 
emission offsets as they arise over time. We also treat the concept of rental of carbon 
sequestered through LBS, and examine bridge-to-the-future scenarios, which introduce 
nonconstant future GHGE offset prices. Finally, we investigate the implications that 
permanence-related price discounts may have on the potential contribution of LBS 
activities to GHGE offset efforts. 
 
Background 
Permanence is a concern with respect to sequestration because of an ecosystems-
limited ability to take up carbon, which we will call saturation, and the fact that 
management options can cause the sequestered carbon to be released, which we will call 
volatility. Here we examine the relative value of sequestration and emission offsets, given 
their different saturation and volatility characteristics.  
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Saturation 
LBS activities exhibit saturation when storage reservoirs fill up due to physical or 
biological capacity. Two prominent forms of LBS are reductions in agricultural soil 
tillage intensity and establishment of trees on currently unforested lands (i.e., 
afforestation). In terms of tillage, West et al. summarize the observed carbon increments 
over time arising from about forty tillage change experiments. Their results show that by 
year 20, the carbon increments in all the forty experiments have dropped essentially to 
zero—evidence of saturation. On the forestry side, afforestation carbon is sequestered in 
both soil and standing trees. Data from Birdsey show that forest carbon sequestration 
reaches a limit, with soil carbon saturating and trees eventually growing at a declining 
rate, although this takes longer than in the case of agriculture. However, forest cases 
become yet more complex when harvesting is introduced, as significant fractions of the 
carbon are retained in harvested wood products.  
Volatility 
LBS-sequestered carbon is also commonly considered nonpermanent because its 
storage form is often volatile and subject to subsequent release through land use change, 
tillage change, harvesting, fires, or other natural and anthropogenic disturbances. For 
example, cutting down an LBS-developed forest and plowing the soil up for farmland 
quickly releases much of the sequestered carbon. Replacing no-till agriculture with a 
moldboard plowing system also quickly releases carbon.  
Cost Implications of Saturation and Volatility  
Saturation and volatility introduce additional terms that must be considered when 
examining the cost of an LBS offset. In particular, both emission and sequestration 
efforts involve an initial outlay for development and implementation of an activity that 
generates offsets and operating expenses for keeping that activity going over time. 
However, the combination of saturation and volatility for LBS strategies also introduces a 
potential third cost item: a maintenance cost to keep the carbon sequestered, possibly 
even after saturation has been achieved. 
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Context for Greenhouse Gas Emission Offset Purchases 
Before proceeding with economic analysis, it is useful to consider the context for 
GHGE offset purchases. Suppose a firm or country has a capped amount of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) it can emit. To exceed that amount it must obtain rights. Suppose that entity 
wishes to pursue a production pattern that will emit GHGs in excess of its annual limit for 
the foreseeable future. Assume that several purchase opportunities present themselves. 
The opportunities involve offers from those who can directly reduce emissions, sequester 
carbon in agricultural soils, and sequester carbon in forests. In this context, the main 
question investigated herein becomes, How do the different saturation and volatility 
characteristics manifest themselves in the price that the entity would be willing to pay for 
a unit of carbon for each opportunity? 
 
An Analytical Approach for Comparing the Value of Offsets 
GHG emission offsets occur over time. Offsets could involve the development of 
enterprises such as  
(a) an emissions-reducing, fuel-switching project that offsets emissions for many 
years; 
(b) adoption of reduced tillage on cropped soils that saturate after 20 years; or 
(c) establishment of a forest on agricultural lands that sequesters carbon for 60+ 
years. 
In cases (b) and (c), if the reduced tillage or forest use were eventually discontinued there 
would be future releases of the sequestered carbon back into the atmosphere. These 
dynamic considerations imply that a comparison of sequestration methods should adjust 
for the time value of emissions offsets, as argued in Richards and in Fearnside, Lashof, 
and Moura-Costa.  
Thus, we use a net present value framework, much like that used in Feng, Zhao, and 
Kling, and we solve for the constant real emissions price, which equates the net present 
value of the GHGE offset by a strategy with the net present value of the costs for strategy 
implementation. From a mathematical standpoint, we solve for p in the following equation: 
0 0
(1 ) (1 )
T T
t t
t t
t t
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where p is a constant real price of emission offsets, r is the discount rate, T is the number 
of years in the planning horizon, Et is the quantity of emissions offset in year t, and Ct is 
the cost of the emissions offset program in year t. 
 To proceed with the analysis, we make several assumptions. First, to facilitate 
comparison across the offset options, we assume equal incremental carbon generation 
potential offset rates and implementation costs for all—one unit of carbon per period at a 
price of one unit. Second, we evaluate the incremental costs and returns caused by use of 
each offset strategy over a period of 100 years. Third, we use a 4 percent real discount 
rate. Fourth, to keep the mathematics more straightforward, we use linear approximations 
for the annual sequestration rates. For example, we have a one-unit offset for every year 
until the point of saturation, and a zero offset thereafter. Emissions from any carbon 
dioxide released after the saturation point (e.g., from harvest or reversion to conventional 
tillage) also are approximated linearly.  
The Value of an Emission Offset 
First, we consider a direct GHGE offset. These offsets would come about from such 
things as fuel-switching and using less fertilizer. We assume that opportunity yields a 
one-unit emission offset for one monetary unit per year. We also assume that the program 
can be continued over the whole 100-year period. Application of our net present value 
framework shows that the break-even real carbon price (p) for this is 1.00.  
The Relative Value of an Agricultural Soil Offset 
Now suppose we consider an agricultural-soil-based offset coming about by changing 
tillage from an intensive system to a reduced-tillage system. Based on West et al. we 
assume that saturation occurs in year 20. We also assume for comparability that the system 
sequesters one unit of carbon per year for the first 20 years and zero thereafter at a cost of 
one unit per year for as long as the payment is in place. We consider three different 
possibilities about the agricultural practice and program payments beyond year 20. Namely, 
farmers are paid to switch tillage for 20 years, and then one of the following occurs: 
(A-I) At the end of the 20 years the payment ceases. In turn, farmers acting in 
their own best interest revert back to conventional tillage. Subsequently, 
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we assume that the sequestered carbon volatilizes and is released over 
three years in equal increments of 6.67 units. 
(A-II) The payment continues, with farmers being paid for the full 100 years to 
continue the practice of maintaining the sequestered carbon, but carbon 
accumulation ceases at year 20.  
(A-III) At the end of the 20 years, the payment ceases. However, farmers acting 
in their own best interest maintain the practice, thereby maintaining the 
carbon. 
The carbon and cost profiles differ across the scenarios. The cumulative amount of 
additional carbon rises in linear fashion up to year 20, then either remains the same (cases 
A-II and A-III) or drops to zero over three years when the subsidy is discontinued (case 
A-III). The total program cost rises until year 20, then stays the same under cases A-I and 
A-III or continues to rise for the entire 100 years (case A-II). 
When we compute the real price (p) that equates the net present value of the 
sequestration offsets with the value of the reduction, we get 2.64 for case A-I where the 
carbon is released, 1.80 for case A-II where the farmer is paid well past the saturation 
point, and 1.00 for case A-III where the practice continues without subsidy. This shows 
that saturating agricultural soil carbon that requires a subsidy for the practice to be 
continued is worth only 38 to 56 percent as much as the one-unit break-even price for the 
emission offset. Thus, while the emission reductions are valued at the amortized cost of 
generating them, the saturating and volatile nature of agricultural soil sequestration will 
result in a discount if either the carbon is released or the cost continues beyond the 
saturation point and the free lunch of case A-III does not occur. Under a 50 percent 
discount, this implies that for an LBS agricultural soil activity to be competitive with a 
direct emissions reduction costing $100 a ton, it would have to cost $50 or less per ton. 
Expanding to Consider Forestry Offsets 
Now consider a forest-based offset. In general, such offsets would come about from 
afforestation, lengthening harvest rotations, ceasing harvests altogether, or improving 
management. For simplicity, in this paper we consider only afforestation. Forest carbon 
sequestration entails four types of carbon gains or emission offsets. First, forest soils hold 
more carbon than agricultural soils because trees have larger root systems, forest soils are 
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disturbed less frequently, and forests deposit and retain more surface matter litter. 
Second, standing trees hold carbon in their leaves, limbs, and trunk. Third, harvested 
timber products are substantially made up of carbon and may be placed in long-term 
storage through their use in such things as buildings and furniture. Fourth, a sizeable 
portion of harvested forest carbon offsets GHGE as it replaces fossil fuel energy and 
accompanying emissions. This occurs both through the trees used as fuel wood and 
through the use of milling residues for co-generation.  
Forestry offsets also exhibit saturation and volatility. Volatility occurs upon harvest, 
where lands either revert to agriculture or have much of their aboveground and 
belowground biomass removed in the harvesting process. Soils saturate and trees 
eventually become mature, where net growth is matched by net losses. We set up 
scenarios that evaluate various dimensions of the problem in Table 1, including 
· timing of forest harvest (if it occurs at all); 
· whether reforestation occurs after harvest; 
· the period of time over which payments occur; and 
· the use of harvest products for pulp or saw timber, which influences residency 
time for harvested carbon as well as for biofuels. 
The time to saturation and post-harvest forest carbon profiles were set up based on 
Birdsey’s data for southeastern U.S. pine plantations. Birdsey’s data for onsite forest 
carbon from the FORCARB model (Birdsey and Heath) is supplemented with data on the 
amount of carbon removed from the site at harvest, decay rates for the logging debris, 
and the carbon disposition by pool (product, landfill, energy use, and emissions) over 
time (Row and Phelps).  
Left alone, our model forest saturates after 80 years. Under the first group of 
scenarios, we keep the forest at least until saturation. To be parallel with the agricultural 
cases, we considered the following scenarios:  
(F-I) Payments cease upon saturation and the stand is harvested. We get p = 1.07 
or a 93 percent value when fuel offsets are counted, which falls to 91 per-
cent without consideration of fuel. 
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TABLE 1.  Scenario descriptions and terms of trade for forest carbon offsets 
Scenario Description Defining Assumptions Computed Results 
With Consideration of Fuel 
Offset 
Without Consideration of 
Fuel Offset 
Broad Scenario  
Class Case 
Harvest 
Age 
Reforest 
After 
Harvest 
Years of 
Payments 
Equivalent 
Price 
Value 
Relative to 
Emission 
Offset 
Equivalent 
Price 
Value 
Relative to 
Emission 
Offset 
        
F-I 80 No 80 1.07 93% 1.10 91% 
F-II Never  100   1.02 98% 
Forest kept to 
saturation 
        
        
F-III 20 No 20 1.54 65% 1.95 51% 
F-IV 20 Yes 100 1.44 69% 1.78 56% 
F-V 20 Yes 20 0.80 125% 0.99 101% 
Shorter rotation 
 forestry (primarily 
 pulpwood) 
        
        
F-VI 50 No 50 1.18 85% 1.26 79% 
F-VII 50 Yes 100 1.15 87% 1.22 82% 
Longer rotation 
 forestry (primarily 
 saw timber) F-VIII 50 Yes 50 1.01 99% 1.07 93% 
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(F-II) Payments continue until year 100 and the stand remains in its saturated state 
after year 80, where we find p = 1.02, or 98 percent of that for emissions 
offsets. 
Next, we turn our attention to a group of scenarios involving managed forests which 
are harvested for products and which volatilize part of their carbon upon harvest. First, 
we consider short rotation lands, primarily managed for pulpwood, which are harvested 
after 20 years. When such lands are harvested and revert back to agriculture we get a 
relative value of 65 percent with fuel offsets considered, and 51 percent without (case F-
III). When the land is reforested, landowners may need to be subsidized only for the first 
rotation (analogous to the agricultural case A-III); then the “discount” factor with fuel 
considered actually rises above 1.0 to 1.254. This indicates a potential willingness to pay 
a premium for a 20-year sequestration project that produced this result, because it 
generates higher net discounted benefits than an emission-reduction program alone.    
 When we consider longer rotations of 50 years, which is primarily a saw timber 
(lumber and plywood) management regime (cases F-VI, F-VII, and F-VIII), we find 
higher relative values because the carbon accumulates in the forest longer and because 
the products have longer shelf lives than those made with pulpwood (paper and 
paperboard).   
Leasing 
Some researchers have paid attention to leasing rather than buying GHGE offsets. In 
particular, Marland and Fruit, and Bennett and Mitchell each extol the attractiveness of 
potential leasing, where at the end of the lease period all bets are off and the leaser must 
find other carbon. Colombia advanced a similar proposal in the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations (United Nations 2000). To investigate the implications of leasing, 
we examined the case of a 20-year lease where when the lease ends there are no more 
payments and there is no guarantee that the carbon stays sequestered. Thus, we use the 
assumption that the carbon volatilizes immediately upon completion of the lease. Under 
these circumstances we find that the leased carbon is worth 36 percent as much as an 
emission offset. Therefore, it appears that leased carbon does have value but would trade 
at a substantial discount. 
Influences of Permanence on the Comparative Value of Biological Sequestration versus Emissions Offsets / 9 
 
Bridge to the Future 
One argument regarding LBS is that it offers a relatively cheap mitigation option that 
can be exercised immediately, allowing reductions and buying time until future GHGE 
rates are reduced by technological change. This raises the specter of nonconstant future 
emission offset prices. In such an arena, several possibilities advance themselves. Future 
prices might 
· rise as regulations are tightened in an escalating attempt to develop an emissions 
cap that will stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations; 
· rise as increasing emissions increase atmospheric GHGs, and the damages due to 
marginal GHG increments rise; 
· fall from current estimates as innovation is stimulated by GHG markets; or 
· initially rise but then fall as innovation occurs. 
The bridge-to-the-future argument is in line with the rising then falling price scenario.  
We thought it desirable to examine the effect of such scenarios on the relative values 
of the offset possibilities. To do this we compared constant real price results with results 
under declining prices over time, prices which peaked at some point in the next 100 
years, and rising prices over time. We assumed the annual change in prices was 1 percent 
in this exercise. The subsequent results for the above cases include leasing but exclude 
the forest variants without biofuel credits. The results in Table 2 show that the LBS and 
leasing opportunities are worth the most the closer the peak price is to today. This is more 
general than the finding of Feng, Zhao, and Kling, which implies that sequestration 
should be undertaken as soon as possible. In our analysis, the relative value of LBS 
activities is greatest when the prices reach their peak. If that occurs in the future, it 
provides an incentive for delayed sequestration. 
Sensitivity to Assumptions 
The analytical framework used here embodies a number of assumptions. We 
performed several experiments to determine the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
assumptions. In particular we examined the effect of the following alternatives. 
Discount Rates. We examined rates from 4 to 8 percent and found the value of the 
saturating assets increased the higher was the discount rate. For example, in agricultural 
soil case I, the saturating carbon was worth only 38 percent as much as an emission offset 
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TABLE 2. Effect of nonconstant price patterns 
Time of Price Peak  
Scenario   No Peak Year 0 Year 10 Year 20 Year 30 Year 40 Year 60 Year 80 Year 100 
Emission 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
A-I  38% 52% 47% 34% 29% 27% 26% 25% 25% 
A-II 55% 63% 62% 58% 54% 51% 48% 47% 47% 
A-III 100% 114% 111% 105% 97% 93% 87% 85% 84% 
F-I    98% 99% 99% 99% 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 
F-II    94% 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 93% 89% 86% 
F-III    66% 82% 79% 69% 59% 55% 52% 50% 50% 
F-IV       66% 71% 70% 67% 65% 63% 61% 60% 60% 
F-V        119% 129% 127% 121% 117% 114% 111% 109% 109% 
F-VI       86% 95% 94% 93% 90% 86% 76% 73% 73% 
F-VII      87% 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 82% 82% 
F-VIII       99% 104% 103% 102% 101% 98% 93% 93% 93% 
Lease 35% 49% 44% 30% 27% 25% 24% 23% 23% 
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under a 4 percent discount rate, but under an 8 percent rate this rose to 63 percent (as also 
shown in Feng, Zhao and Kling). The reason for this is that under saturation, most of the 
benefits accrue in the earlier years, which have a higher discounted value.  
Nonlinear Approaches to Saturation. We found that using an exponential function 
for saturation effects increases the relative values of the saturating strategies relative to 
the linear pattern used above.  
 
Implications of Permanence-Related Discounts for Strategy 
Agricultural and forestry (AF) activities may contribute to net emission reduction 
efforts not only through LBS activities but also in a broader setting. Following McCarl 
and Schneider, the contributions can be grouped into the following categories. 
1. Emissions reductions. Agriculture’s global share of anthropogenic emissions 
has been estimated to be about 50 percent of methane, 70 percent of nitrous 
oxide, and 20 percent of carbon dioxide (IPCC). The methane emissions are 
from rice, livestock, and termites. The nitrous oxide emissions largely are from 
manure and fertilization. The carbon dioxide emissions come from deforesta-
tion, tillage intensification, and fossil fuel use. Management may be employed 
to reduce contributions from these sources.  
2. Creation or expansion of LBS sinks. As discussed above. 
3. Provision of substitute, less emission intensive products. AF can produce 
commodities which substitute for GHGE-intensive products and thereby     
displace emissions. This principally involves biofuels or substitute building 
products. 
Methodology 
Given the preceding options, what are the implications of permanence discounts for 
the absolute desirability of agricultural offsets to offset purchasers and the relative 
desirability of LBS activities compared to other agricultural possibilities? To address this 
question, we derive empirical marginal GHGE abatement curves. These curves estimate 
the amount of AF-sector-developed net emission reductions stimulated under alternative 
carbon prices. The interrelated nature of the AF sectors implies that a complex process 
underlies these abatement curves. For example, an increase in no-till agriculture may alter 
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corn production, which may alter corn prices and cause a response in terms of livestock 
diets, livestock herd size, and manure, as well as an alteration in land values, which 
influences land allocation to biofuels and forests. These changes all have implications for 
GHGE. Thus, the analytical framework employed must depict simultaneous 
implementation of all of the previously discussed strategies in the context of total sectoral 
interaction. While it would have been advantageous to use data observations on 
landowner responsiveness to carbon prices in an econometric estimation of marginal 
abatement curves, this is not possible because no prices are currently available for 
carbon. Consequently, we used a mathematical-programming-based, price-endogenous 
model of the agricultural sector (ASM) (McCarl et al.), modified by Schneider to include 
GHG features (hereafter called ASMGHG). This was coupled with data from the Forest 
and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) (Adams et al.) to generate 
estimates of the abatement curve.  
ASMGHG depicts production, consumption, and international trade in 63 U.S. 
regions of 22 traditional and 3 biofuel crops, 29 animal products, and more than 60 
processed agricultural products. Environmental impacts, such as levels of greenhouse gas 
emission or absorption for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, plus chemical use 
and soil erosion, are included. ASMGHG simulates the market and trade equilibrium in 
agricultural markets of the United States and 28 major foreign trading partners. The 
model is constrained by domestic and foreign supply and demand conditions and by 
resource endowments. The market equilibrium reveals commodity and factor prices, 
levels of domestic production, export and import quantities, management adoption, 
resource usage, and environmental impact indicators. ASMGHG was subjected to carbon 
prices from $0 per ton to $500 per ton. To account for the fact that each GHG has a 
different global warming potential (GWP), GHG quantities were adjusted to 100-year 
GWP equivalents so that each gas was transformed to an equivalent GWP effect of one 
ton of carbon. These GWP adjustments are scalar values of 21 for methane and 310 for 
nitrous oxide, which is based on the molecular weight of carbon in carbon dioxide 
(IPCC). FASOM was used to provide data on the afforestation option by running the 
model under a series of carbon prices to generate a carbon-price-dependent function of 
carbon quantities and land requirements for afforestation. In turn, that function was 
Influences of Permanence on the Comparative Value of Biological Sequestration versus Emissions Offsets / 13 
 
imbedded in ASMGHG to develop coverage of relevant GHGs across the agriculture and 
forest sectors.  
ASMGHG incorporates a relatively complete inventory of the total spectrum of U.S.-
based AF responses to a net greenhouse gas mitigation effort. The strategies considered 
are identified in Table 3. Definitions of those strategies and further details on ASMGHG 
and the processes underlying this study can be found in Schneider, and in McCarl and 
Schneider. 
 
TABLE 3. Mitigation strategies included in the analysis 
Greenhouse Gas 
Effected 
Strategy Basic Nature CO2 CH4 N2O 
Afforestation/timberland 
management 
Sequestration X   
Biofuel production Offset X X X 
Crop mix alteration  Emission, sequestration X  X 
Crop fertilization alteration Emission, sequestration X  X 
Crop input alteration Emission X  X 
Crop tillage alteration Emission X  X 
Grassland conversion  Sequestration X   
Irrigated/dry land 
 conversion 
Emission X  X 
Livestock management  Emission  X  
Livestock herd size 
alteration 
Emission  X X 
Livestock production system 
substitution 
Emission  X X 
Manure management Emission  X  
Rice acreage  Emission  X  
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Empirical Results on the Effect of Permanence Discounts 
 For illustrative purposes, we ran the agricultural and forest sector model with and 
without permanence discounts. Specifically, in one case we ran the model with equal 
prices for all opportunities while in the other case we ran the model with the price applied 
to carbon from tillage changes on agricultural soils equal to 0.50 of a full credit and the 
price from forests equal to 0.75. These adjustments are representative of the permanence 
discount factors estimated in the first part of the paper. The results for the total portfolio 
of chosen AF options appear in Figure 1.  
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FIGURE 1.  Annual net greenhouse gas emissions abatement from agriculture and 
forestry in million metric tons 
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The aggregate marginal abatement curve is given in Panel A of Figure 1. All 
quantities are expressed in million metric tons of carbon equivalent (MMTC) per year. 
For instance, at a price of $100/ton, the AF activities included in this analysis could 
generate roughly 300 MMTC per year, which offsets just one-fifth of total GHG 
emissions for the United States in 1990. However, it seems likely that an actual carbon 
price would be less than $100/ton. For instance, one estimate of the U.S. cost of 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would be roughly $23/ton of carbon (Council of 
Economic Advisors 1998). If the carbon market price were in this range, LBS offsets 
from AF would be more modest—less than 100 MMTC/year. The results in Panel A 
show that discounting for permanence causes a somewhat modest upward shift in the cost 
of achieving any given volume of offsets from the total AF portfolio; i.e., buyers would 
have to pay higher prices to achieve equivalent AF sequestration levels. In addition, the 
presence of discounts causes the optimal portfolio to shift. Namely, the agricultural soil 
(Panel B) and forestry shares (Panel C) decline, with the agricultural soil maximum 
falling by about 10 percent while forestry offsets adjust downward by almost one-third. 
Meanwhile, the share in the undiscounted biofuel option rises (Panel D), reflecting the  
fact that the direct GHGE reductions from biofuel strategies need not be adjusted for 
impermanence, unlike the LBS sequestration strategies. 
 
Conclusions: Squaring Up Various Offset Categories 
The notion that land-based biological greenhouse gas sequestration is impermanent, 
as manifest in its saturation over time and its volatility, generally causes the offsets 
generated to be worth less than emission reduction offsets. The agricultural soil offsets 
examined herein are worth only 38 percent as much as an emissions offset if the carbon 
saturates, payments stop, and it volatilizes at the end of the program. The value rises to 
55 percent if the practice is maintained by continuing subsidies. Under most forest 
scenarios, sequestered carbon in forests is worth from 51 to 99 percent as much as an 
emissions reduction program, contingent on assumptions about the length of the harvest 
rotation, whether reforestation occurs, and whether credits for fuel offsets are applied. 
These discounts lower the potential contribution of sequestration in a sectorwide analysis.  
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In this paper, we incorporate permanence adjustments to the price paid for LBS and 
simulate the effect on marginal abatement functions from the agricultural and forestry 
sectors. In aggregate, the effects of discounting are somewhat modest; however, 
discounting can affect materially the composition of economically optimal strategies 
within the AF sector. Thus, whether the market or policymakers impose such price 
adjustments on sellers and buyers of GHGE offsets can have a substantial effect on the 
distribution of mitigation activities—and land uses—within the AF sectors. 
The timing of sequestration as a mitigation strategy is important. We evaluate in this 
paper the effect of different potential carbon price trajectories. If carbon prices are 
nearing a peak or falling, then sequestration has a strong relative advantage in the short 
run. This is particularly important in light of the fact that large-scale GHGE reduction 
may require the adoption of entirely new technologies that are in various stages of 
development. In contrast, sequestration results from an existing technology endowed by 
nature and thus can be adopted immediately. However, if the carbon prices rise over time 
due to worsening climate impacts or increasingly stringent emission caps, for instance, 
this reduces the advantage of sequestration as a mitigation strategy relative to emission 
reduction through technical change. Because we cannot know with certainty which future 
scenario will prevail, a mixed strategy of sequestration and emissions reduction might be 
the most prudent path to long-run cost-effective mitigation.
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